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THE LIMITS OF EXECUTIVE CLEMENCY: 
HOW THE VIRGINIA SUPREME COURT 
BLOCKED THE RESTORATION OF FELONS’ 
POLITICAL RIGHTS IN HOWELL v. 
MCAULIFFE 
ALEXANDER PRINGLE* 
Abstract: On July 22, 2016, the Supreme Court of Virginia found Virginia Gov-
ernor Terence McAuliffe’s actions restoring full political rights to 206,000 Vir-
ginians convicted of a felony unconstitutional. At the same time, the court issued 
a writ of mandamus ordering Commonwealth officials to remove these convicted 
felons from the voting rolls and return their names to the list of prohibited voters. 
Governor McAuliffe had restored the political rights of these released felons en 
masse, via a single Executive Order on April 22, 2016, eschewing the typical 
case-by-case review process for restoration of voting rights. The majority in the 
case held that the Governor’s Executive Order of April 22, 2016, along with sub-
sequent orders, had violated article I, section 7 of the Virginia Constitution by il-
legally suspending the execution of laws without consent of the representatives 
of the people. The dissenting justices, applying a different interpretation, argued 
that the petitioners in the case lacked standing to pursue their claim, and that 
even if they had such standing, Governor McAuliffe’s actions would have been 
proper based on the plain reading of the Virginia Constitution. This comment ar-
gues that Justice Powell’s dissent most faithfully interprets the Virginia Constitu-
tion. It contends that given the contested nature of the historical record and the 
plain meaning of the constitutional language, the Virginia Supreme Court erred in 
finding Governor McAuliffe’s actions unconstitutional. 
INTRODUCTION 
On April 22, 2016, Governor Terence McAuliffe of Virginia issued an 
Executive Order which restored the full political rights of 206,000 disenfran-
chised Virginia citizens, including the right to hold public office, vote, act as a 
notary public, and serve on a jury.1 The affected citizens had previously been 
convicted of felonies in the Commonwealth of Virginia, but had completed 
their sentences by the time of the Executive Order.2 
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 1 Howell v. McAuliffe, 788 S.E.2d 706, 710 (Va. 2016). 
 2 Id. See generally Marc Mauer, Felon Voting Disenfranchisement: A Growing Collateral Conse-
quences of Mass Incarceration, 12 FED. SENT’G REP. 248, 248 (2000) (“In the most extreme case, 
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On May 23, 2016, the Speaker of the Virginia House of Delegates, the 
Majority Leader of the Virginia Senate, and four registered voters filed a peti-
tion with the Virginia Supreme Court against Governor McAuliffe and his ad-
ministration.3 Their petition for writs of mandamus and prohibition sought to 
void the new voter registrations, prevent any future registrations by the con-
victed felons, and bar Governor McAuliffe from issuing any future class-based 
restorations of voting rights.4 
After entertaining briefs and arguments, the Virginia Supreme Court on 
July 22, 2016 found that Governor McAuliffe’s Executive Order of April 22, 
2016 had violated article I, section 7 and article II, section 1 of the Virginia 
Constitution.5 Specifically, the majority found that the petitioners had adequate 
standing to pursue the case as aggrieved parties, that the respondents had ade-
quately represented all necessary parties in the case, that the Governor’s ac-
tions had violated the Virginia Constitution, and that writs of mandamus and 
prohibition were appropriate remedies.6 In their dissents, both Justice William 
Mims and Justice Cleo Powell contested the standing of the petitioners to bring 
the case.7 Justice Powell argued further that a plain reading of the language of 
the Virginia Constitution revealed that Governor McAuliffe’s Executive Order 
did not violate the Virginia Constitution, and asserted that the majority had 
used a novel statutory construction to find such a violation.8 
                                                                                                                           
offenders in 14 states can lose the right to vote for life as a result of a felony conviction . . . . Thus, for 
example, an 18-year-old convicted of felony drug possession in Virginia who is sentenced to a treat-
ment program which he successfully completes is disenfranchised for life even though he may not 
have spent a day in jail.”). 
 3 Howell, 788 S.E.2d at 711. 
 4 Id. See generally Mandamus, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“[M]andamus [is] 
. . . [a] writ issued by a court to compel performance of a particular act by a lower court or govern-
mental officer or body, usu. to correct a prior action or failure to act.”); Prohibition, BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“[P]rohibition [is] . . . [a]n extraordinary writ issued by an appellate 
court to prevent a lower court from exceeding its jurisdiction or to prevent a nonjudicial officer or 
entity from exercising a power.”). 
 5 VA. CONST. art. I, § 7 (“[A]ll power of suspending laws, or the execution of laws, by any au-
thority, without consent of the representatives of the people, is injurious to their rights, and ought not 
to be exercised.”); id. art. II, § 1 (“No person who has been convicted of a felony shall be qualified to 
vote unless his civil rights have been restored by the Governor or other appropriate authority.”); see 
Howell, 788 S.E.2d at 724. 
 6 See Howell, 788 S.E.2d at 715–16, 724–25. The petitioners in Howell v. McAuliffe claimed that 
as Virginia citizens, “their votes ha[d] been diluted by the unconstitutional addition of 206,000 dis-
qualified voters to the statewide electorate.” Id. at 715. In this way, they had suffered a redressable 
injury and therefore should have standing before the court. See id. The court agreed, holding that “pe-
titioners in this case have standing to assert that their voting rights have been harmed by an allegedly 
unconstitutional manipulation of the electorate.” Id. See generally Standing, BLACK’S LAW DICTION-
ARY, (10th ed. 2014) (“[S]tanding [is] . . . [a] party’s right to make a legal claim or seek judicial en-
forcement of a duty or right.”). 
 7 See Howell, 788 S.E.2d at 730 (Mims, J., dissenting); id. at 740 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
 8 See id. at 740 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
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Part I of this comment summarizes the factual and procedural history of 
Howell v. McAuliffe. Part II discusses the majority’s opinion that the Gover-
nor’s Executive Order violated article I, section 7 of the Virginia Constitution 
by effectively inverting the voter disqualification provision in article II, section 
1. Part III agrees with the majority’s finding of sufficient standing to decide the 
case, but sides with Justice Powell’s dissent as to the constitutionality of Gov-
ernor McAuliffe’s executive orders. Part III also argues that Justice Powell’s 
dissent is simultaneously most faithful to the plain meaning of the Virginia 
Constitution and protects the interests of a historically oppressed minority. 
I. THE RELEVANT PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF THE CHALLENGE TO 
GOVERNOR MCAULIFFE’S ORDER AND THE SECTIONS  
OF THE VIRGINIA CONSTITUTION IN DISPUTE 
On April 22, 2016, Virginia Governor Terence McAuliffe restored by ex-
ecutive order the full political rights of 206,000 Virginia citizens who had been 
previously convicted of a felony.9 Although the affected citizens had complet-
ed their criminal sentences, including periods of probation and parole, they had 
been stripped permanently of their right to vote pursuant to article II, section 1 
of the Virginia Constitution.10 McAuliffe’s Executive Order specifically re-
stored the right to vote, the right to serve on a jury, the right to hold public of-
fice, and the right to act as a notary public.11 
Governor McAuliffe simultaneously revealed that he would continue to 
issue comparable executive orders at the end of each month restoring the rights 
to convicted felons who had newly completed their sentences, including proba-
tion and parole.12 Following through with this pledge, Governor McAuliffe 
                                                                                                                           
 9 Howell v. McAuliffe, 788 S.E.2d 706, 710 (Va. 2016) (majority opinion). 
 10 VA. CONST. art. II, § 1; Howell, 788 S.E.2d at 710, 716. Eligible voters in Virginia must be 
citizens at least eighteen years of age, fulfill the residency requirement, and be registered to vote. VA. 
CONST. art. II, § 1. In addition, the section provides specifically that “[n]o person who has been con-
victed of a felony shall be qualified to vote unless his civil rights have been restored by the Governor 
or other appropriate authority.” Id. Historically, this provision has functionally removed the right to 
vote from any citizen of Virginia who has committed a felony. See Howell, 788 S.E.2d at 716. The 
Governor possesses the ability to restore voting rights to people who have been convicted of felonies. 
Id. This has traditionally been done on a case-by-case basis, with individual reviews conducted on the 
particular details of a case. Id. 
 11 Howell, 788 S.E.2d at 710. Howell invalidated Governor McAuliff’s executive order. Id. at 
706; see also Governor McAuliffe Restores Voting and Civil Rights to Over 200,000 Virginians, VIR-
GINIA.GOV (Apr. 22, 2016), https://governor.virginia.gov/newsroom/newsarticle?articleId=15008 
[https://perma.cc/3AD5-VUCH] (“The civil rights restored by this Order are: (1) the right to vote; (2) 
the right to hold public office; (3) the right to serve on a jury; and (4) the right to act as a notary pub-
lic.”). 
 12 Howell, 788 S.E.2d at 711. The Governor is not able to issue pardons prospectively—that is, he 
is not able to issue pardons for convictions that have not yet occurred. Id. Rather he is only empow-
ered to issue pardons for convictions as they occur. Id. Thus Governor McAuliffe would have to issue 
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issued executive orders on May 31, 2016, and again on June 24, 2016, restor-
ing political rights to such Virginians.13 
Opponents quickly challenged Governor McAuliffe’s actions, claiming 
that his orders “defie[d] the plain text of the Constitution, flout[ed] the separa-
tion of powers, and ha[d] no precedent in the annals of Virginia history.”14 Led 
by Speaker of the Virginia House of Delegates William J. Howell, a group of 
petitioners composed of registered Virginia voters filed a lawsuit against Gov-
ernor McAuliffe and several other parties.15 They argued that the governor had 
overstepped the bounds of his constitutionally granted authority.16 As a result, 
they requested writs of mandamus and prohibition from the Virginia Supreme 
Court to revoke any voter registrations that had been completed as a result of 
Governor McAuliffe’s order, halt any additional registrations, and bar the gov-
ernor from issuing any future executive orders that would restore the voting 
rights en masse to newly released convicted felons who had completed their 
sentences.17 
The respondents replied to the suit by filing a motion to dismiss and a re-
sponse to the petition.18 The motion was predicated on the following asser-
tions: that the petitioners did not have the standing required to petition the 
court; that they had neglected to join necessary parties; and that they had not 
sufficiently demonstrated that the executive orders at issue were beyond the 
scope of the governor’s legal authority.19 The respondents further contended 
that the petition failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted and 
that the Governor’s actions were in fact constitutional under the plain language 
of article V, section 12 of the Virginia Constitution.20 
On July 22, 2016, the Virginia Supreme Court found Governor 
McAuliffe’s actions to be in violation of the Virginia Constitution.21 The ma-
jority found that Governor McAuliffe’s executive orders violated article I, sec-
tion 7 and article II, section 1 of the Virginia Constitution.22 The majority not-
                                                                                                                           
pardons each month to restore the political rights of the Virginia citizens who had been convicted of a 
felony and had completed their sentences in the past month. Id. 
 13 Id. 
 14 Id. 
 15 Id. The other parties were the Secretary of the Commonwealth, the Virginia Department of 
Elections, and the State Board of Elections. Id. 
 16 See id. 
 17 Id. 
 18 Id. 
 19 Id. at 711–12. 
 20 Id.; see VA. CONST. art. V, § 12 (“The Governor . . . shall communicate to the General Assem-
bly, at each regular session, particulars of every case of fine or every penalty remitted, of reprieve or 
pardon granted, and of punishment commuted, with his reasons for remitting, granting, or commuting 
the same.”). 
 21 Howell, 788 S.E.2d at 724. 
 22 VA. CONST. art. I, § 7; id. art. II, § 1; Howell, 788 S.E.2d at 724. Article I, section 7 of the 
Virginia Constitution restricts the governor’s ability to suspend laws passed by the Virginia General 
2017] Howell v. McAuliffe and the Limits of Executive Clemency 65 
ed that Governor McAuliffe’s categorical use of his executive clemency power 
exceeded his authority under article V, section 12, which, when read in histori-
cal context and considering past practice, required him to communicate to the 
General Assembly the details of every case involving clemency and his reasons 
for each pardon.23 They also noted that his categorical use of his clemency 
power, even if it were allowed by article V, section 12, also violated article I, 
section 7 of the Virginia Constitution, which denies the Governor the power to 
suspend laws or the execution of laws without the legislature’s consent.24 The 
majority further found that the petitioners had sufficient standing to bring the 
petition and that all necessary parties had been adequately represented.25 Ac-
cordingly, the majority issued the writs of mandamus and prohibition, and or-
dered the Governor and his administration to remove the affected citizens from 
the voting rolls and ensure that only qualified voters be registered to vote.26 
Two Justices filed dissents in the case.27 Justice William Mims wrote a dis-
sent focused entirely on the petitioner’s lack of standing for a writ of manda-
mus.28 He noted that previous precedent had established that petitioners request-
ing a writ of mandamus were required to have either a statutory right of action or 
a particularized injury different from that of the rest of the public.29 Analyzing 
the facts of the case, he found that the majority had inappropriately applied pre-
vious precedent from Wilkins v. West, failing to note the distinction between an 
injury to a single electoral district as opposed to an injury to the entire common-
wealth.30 Justice Mims concluded that, although the record was currently insuf-
                                                                                                                           
Assembly. VA. CONST. art. I, § 7. The provision states “[t]hat all power of suspending laws, or the 
execution of laws, by any authority, without consent of the representatives of the people, is injurious 
to their rights, and ought not to be exercised.” Id. The anti-suspension provision was present in the 
first Virginia Constitution, adopted in 1776, and has been included in every subsequent version, in-
cluding the current one, enacted in 1971. Howell, 788 S.E.2d at 720–21. Historically the provision 
was created to curb what was then considered to be one of the most abhorrent practices of the English 
monarchy, namely the royal suspension of acts of Parliament. See id. at 721–22. The focus of the 
provision was to ensure that the Governor of Virginia would not be able to simply suspend laws 
passed by the General Assembly and, by doing so, disregard the rights of Virginia citizens. See id. at 
720–21. 
 23 See VA. CONST. art. V, § 12; Howell, 788 S.E.2d at 719. 
 24 See VA CONST. art. I, § 7; id. art. V, § 12; Howell, 788 S.E.2d at 720. 
 25 Howell, 788 S.E.2d at 715. 
 26 Id. at 724–25. 
 27 Id. at 725 (Mims, J., dissenting); id. at 730 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
 28 Id. at 725 (Mims, J., dissenting). 
 29 See id. at 725–27; Goldman v. Landsidle, 552 S.E.2d 67, 72 (Va. 2001) (finding that to have 
standing in a suit requesting a writ of mandamus against the Commonwealth of Virginia, a Virginia 
citizen or taxpayer must possess either a “statutory right” to bring suit or, in the absence thereof, to be 
able to “demonstrate a direct interest” separate and distinct from the public interest). 
 30 Howell, 788 S.E.2d at 727–29 (Mims, J., dissenting); see Wilkins v. West, 571 S.E.2d 100, 107 
(Va. 2002) (ruling that residents in gerrymandered districts had suffered a particularized injury—their 
voting power had been diluted and weakened relative to that of citizens of other Virginia districts—
and therefore had standing.). 
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ficient to establish standing, he would have allowed the parties additional time to 
produce evidence of standing before issuing a final decision.31 
Justice Cleo Powell, joined by Justice S. Bernard Goodwyn, took a 
broader view in her dissent.32 Justice Powell largely agreed with Justice Mims’ 
reasoning, finding that the petitioners lacked standing to pursue a writ of man-
damus.33 Justice Powell went beyond Justice Mims’ dissent, however, finding 
that Governor McAuliffe’s actions were fully within the bounds of the Consti-
tution of Virginia and that therefore no injury had occurred.34 Justice Powell 
noted specifically that the executive orders had not violated article I, section 7, 
because to the extent that they conflicted with article II, section 1, they did so 
in a manner prescribed in the Constitution.35 Justice Powell argued that be-
cause article II, section 1 expressly provided for a method of restoration for 
these rights, and because it included no explicit restrictions on how this power 
could be used, the logical inference was that no such restrictions existed.36 She 
found further support in what she viewed as the textually unrestricted nature of 
the Governor’s clemency powers.37 
II. A DIVIDED COURT: PROPER STANDING AND CONSTITUTIONAL 
VIOLATIONS OR A LACK OF STANDING AND  
NO CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATIONS 
In the majority opinion written by Chief Justice Donald W. Lemons, the 
Supreme Court of Virginia found that Governor McAuliffe’s executive orders 
had violated the Virginia Constitution.38 Justice William Mims wrote a solo 
dissent focusing almost entirely on the issue of standing, finding that the peti-
tioners lacked standing based on the court’s past precedent.39 Justice Cleo 
Powell wrote a dissent, joined by Justice S. Bernard Goodwyn, which focused 
on the petitioner’s lack of standing and on the plain reading of the contested 
statute.40 
                                                                                                                           
 31 Howell, 788 S.E.2d at 730 (Mims, J., dissenting). 
 32 See id. at 731 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
 33 Id. 
 34 See id. at 740. 
 35 See VA. CONST. art. I, § 7; id. art. II, § 1; Howell, 788 S.E.2d at 734–35 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
 36 See VA. CONST. art. II, § 1; Howell, 788 S.E.2d at 734, 736 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
 37 See Howell, 788 S.E.2d at 737 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
 38 Howell v. McAuliffe, 788 S.E.2d 706, 710 (Va. 2016) (majority opinion). 
 39 Id. at 725 (Mims, J., dissenting). 
 40 Id. at 730, 740 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
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A. The Majority Opinion 
The majority found that Governor McAuliffe’s executive orders had vio-
lated the Virginia Constitution.41 Applying the precedent in Wilkins v. West, the 
court asserted that the petitioners had demonstrated sufficient standing to pur-
sue a writ of mandamus.42 The petitioners in the present case had asserted that 
their voting rights were threatened by an unconstitutional manipulation of the 
electorate, specifically the unconstitutional addition of 206,000 disqualified 
voters to the Virginia voter rolls.43 The court noted that failing to decide the 
dispute on grounds of standing would be “an inexcusable failure on our part to 
fulfill our duty to interpret and apply Virginia law in a case where the parties 
are ‘actual adversaries’ and the legal issues have been ‘fully and faithfully de-
veloped.’”44 The court similarly found that all necessary parties had been 
joined or adequately represented in the suit and that therefore this was no basis 
to dismiss the action.45 
The court then determined that the Governor’s executive orders had vio-
lated article I, section 7 and article II, section 1 of the Virginia Constitution.46 
The court began by considering whether article II, section 1 allowed for the 
kind of blanket issuing of clemency that Governor McAuliffe granted in his 
executive orders.47 Considering the historical factors motivating the constitu-
tional provision’s adoption, past governors’ interpretations of its meaning, and 
the actions of previous General Assemblies, the court concluded that article II, 
section 1 did not confer this blanket power upon the governor.48 In reviewing 
the historical record and past practices, the court argued that it did not support 
Governor McAuliffe’s argument that his clemency powers, contained in article 
V, section 12, were unrestrained and absolute, thus allowing him to issue such 
sweeping orders.49 The court reasoned that the plain text of article V, section 
                                                                                                                           
 41 Id. at 724 (majority opinion). 
 42 Id. at 713–16; Wilkins v. West, 571 S.E.2d 100, 107 (Va. 2002). 
 43 Howell, 788 S.E.2d at 712. 
 44 Id. at 715 (quoting Cupp v. Bd. of Supervisors, 318 S.E.2d 407, 411 (Va. 1984)). 
 45 Id. at 716. 
 46 VA. CONST. art. I, § 7; id. art II, § 1; Howell, 788 S.E.2d at 716–19, 724. 
 47 See VA. CONST. art. II, § 1; Howell, 788 S.E.2d at 716. 
 48 VA. CONST. art. II, § 1; Howell, 788 S.E.2d at 716–19, 724. 
 49 VA. CONST. art. V, § 12; Howell, 788 S.E.2d at 710, 719–20. Previous governors of Virginia 
had considered the scope of their executive clemency power to be limited to use on a case-by-case 
basis. See Howell, 788 S.E.2d at 716–17. None of the previous seventy-one Virginia Governors to 
serve before Governor McAuliffe had ever issued a blanket clemency order. See id. at 716. Previous 
governors had investigated the question, however. Id. In 2010, Governor Tim Kaine considered issu-
ing an executive order similar to the one Governor McAuliffe eventually issued and asked Counselor 
to the Governor, Mark Rubin, to review the legality of such a proposal. Id. Rubin’s review came to the 
simple conclusion that a blanket use of the governor’s clemency power to restore voting rights was 
not authorized by article II, section 1. VA. CONST. art. II, § 1; Howell, 788 S.E.2d at 716. Rubin con-
cluded that the power could be exercised only “in particular cases to named individuals for whom a 
68 Boston College Journal of Law & Social Justice [Vol. 37:E. Supp. 
12, when read in combination with article II, section 1, established that the ex-
ecutive clemency power was meant to be limited.50 The court noted that such 
an interpretation simultaneously remained faithful to the views of the original 
framers of the Virginia Constitution and to the interpretation of the previous 
governors.51 
The court noted, however, that it need not decide the case purely on past 
practice and interpretation of executive clemency powers.52 The court con-
cluded that article I, section 7 had been included in the Virginia Constitution to 
prevent exactly the sort of use of executive power that Governor McAuliffe 
exerted in this case.53 The court cited that the framers had been concerned 
about past abuses by English kings and had sought a protection in the constitu-
tion against the suspension of duly enacted laws by an unbridled executive.54 
The court reasoned that if the suspension clause was but a mere truism against 
Governor McAuliffe’s executive clemency power, then the governor would 
possess an unlimited power to suspend any criminal law with which he disa-
greed.55 The court concluded that this was exactly the kind of power the fram-
ers sought to keep from the Virginia executive.56 
B. Justice Mims’ Dissent 
In his solo dissent, Justice William Mims focused on whether the peti-
tioners had adequate standing to pursue their claims.57 Justice Mims began his 
analysis by recognizing the limited role of the judiciary and the fundamental 
importance of standing, underscoring the bedrock principle that the court did 
not have the authority to consider the merits of the case unless it first had ju-
risdiction over it.58 Based on past precedent of the court, he explained, stand-
ing could be derived from two places: a right provided in statute or a particu-
larized injury “separate and distinct” from any interest of the public.59 Finding 
no statutory right to be present in the case, he instead looked for a particular 
injury.60 
                                                                                                                           
specific grant of executive clemency is sought.” Howell, 788 S.E.2d at 716. Citing this advice, Gover-
nor Kaine declined to issue such an executive order. Id. at 717. 
 50 See VA. CONST. art II, § 1; id. art. V, § 12; Howell, 788 S.E.2d at 720. 
 51 Howell, 788 S.E.2d at 718–19. 
 52 Id. at 720. 
 53 See VA. CONST. art. I, § 7; Howell, 788 S.E.2d at 720–21. 
 54 Howell, 788 S.E.2d at 720–22. 
 55 Id. at 723. 
 56 Id. at 724. 
 57 Id. at 725–30 (Mims, J., dissenting). 
 58 Id. at 725–26. 
 59 Id. at 726–27; Wilkins v. West, 571 S.E.2d 100, 107 (Va. 2002); Goldman v. Landsidle, 552 
S.E.2d 67, 72 (Va. 2001). 
 60 See Howell, 788 S.E.2d at 727 (Mims, J., dissenting). 
2017] Howell v. McAuliffe and the Limits of Executive Clemency 69 
Justice Mims disapproved of the court’s reliance on Wilkins as a prece-
dent for allowing the petitioners to proceed.61 Mims compared the two cases 
and found Wilkins to be inapposite; he noted that whereas Wilkins had involved 
racially gerrymandered districts, which meant that the votes of individuals in 
one district might be worth less than those in another, the facts before the court 
in Howell involved a single entity, namely the entire Commonwealth of Virgin-
ia.62 Justice Mims concluded that this meant that every voter would suffer 
equal harm as a result of 206,000 people being added to the voter rolls, and as 
a result no one could show an injury greater than that of any other voter.63 Jus-
tice Mims left the door open, however, for further action; he held that although 
the record before the court did not support standing, it was possible that more 
evidence could allow for standing to be demonstrated.64 As a result, he con-
cluded by stating he would not have dismissed the suit but instead would have 
allowed the parties to develop more evidence and provide additional briefing 
on the issue of standing.65 
C. Justice Powell’s Dissent 
Justice Cleo Powell’s dissent built upon Justice Mims’, finding not only 
that the petitioners lacked standing, but also that McAuliffe’s executive orders 
had not violated the Virginia Constitution.66 Like Justice Mims, Justice Powell 
found that the petitioners did not have the requisite standing to pursue the 
case.67 Justice Powell interpreted the decision in Wilkins narrowly, construing 
it to provide a right of action only in cases involving residency in a racially 
gerrymandered district.68 Absent this factor, the petitioners would have to 
demonstrate an actual injury.69 Concluding that the petitioners could not prove 
a specific injury distinct from other Virginia voters, Justice Powell concluded 
that they lacked standing.70 
Unlike Justice Mims, Justice Powell went on to consider the underlying 
constitutional claims.71 She noted that article I, section 7 should be read as a 
generalized check on executive power, whereas article V, section 12 should be 
read as a specific grant of authority to restore voting rights to convicted fel-
                                                                                                                           
 61 Id. at 727–28. 
 62 Id. at 728–29. 
 63 Id. at 729. 
 64 Id. at 730. 
 65 Id. 
 66 Id. at 730–40 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
 67 Id. at 731. 
 68 Id. at 732. 
 69 Id. 
 70 Id. 
 71 Id. at 733. 
70 Boston College Journal of Law & Social Justice [Vol. 37:E. Supp. 
ons.72 Based on canons of construction and past precedent, she concluded that 
article V, section 12, being a specific grant of authority, should be given priori-
ty over the general restriction of article I, section 7.73 Justice Powell argued 
that Governor McAuliffe’s use of his power to restore felons’ voting rights was 
exactly the type of action contemplated by article V, section 12 and therefore 
was an exception to the general restrictions of article I, section 7.74 
After concluding that McAuliffe’s executive orders did not abrogate arti-
cle I, section 7, Justice Powell analyzed the relationship between article II, sec-
tion 1 and article V, section 12 and found them to be complementary.75 A plain 
reading, she said, revealed that article II, section 1 removed felons’ voting 
rights until they had been restored.76 Article V, section 12 gave the governor 
the ability to restore political rights without any explicit limitations.77 There-
fore, Justice Powell concluded, the two provisions when read together gave the 
governor unfettered authority to restore felons voting rights.78 Rather than de-
ferring to the supposed intentions of the framers or the past practices of the 
governor or General Assembly, Justice Powell found that the canons demanded 
instead a plain reading of the language.79 Because article V, section 12 pre-
scribed no specific limitations, and article II, section 1 expressly allowed for 
restoration with no restrictions, Justice Powell urged that the correct conclu-
sion was the governor possessed an unrestrained power.80 Accordingly, Justice 
Powell found the governor had not violated the constitution in issuing his ex-
ecutive orders.81 
III. THE COURT SHOULD NOT VALUE HISTORICAL INTERPRETATIONS OVER 
THE PLAIN READING OF THE STATUTE AND SHOULD CONSIDER THE 
EFFECTS OF ITS RULING 
Striking a balance between deference to the intent of the framers of the 
Virginia Constitution and a faithful reading of its plain language, Justice Pow-
ell’s dissent is more convincing than the majority’s opinion on the substantive 
issues at stake in Howell v. McAuliffe.82 Justice Powell gave primary weight to 
the plain reading of article V, section 12, arguing that the cannons of construc-
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tion weighed in favor of what the framers had written, rather than of what the 
majority believed the framers had intended.83 Justice Powell indicated that the 
historical record is far from clear as to the intent of the framers, noting that 
although some of the governor’s clemency powers are expressly limited in the 
constitution, his powers to remove political disabilities are not.84 As she men-
tions, this demonstrates that the framers were aware of methods to restrict this 
power, as they had restricted others, and had, for whatever reason, chosen not 
to include similar language for the restoration of political rights.85 Although 
one could guess as to what the framers intended, what they wrote is clear and 
Justice Powell is correct to give greater weight to what they wrote, rather than 
what some believe they intended.86 
Justice Powell also has the weight of public policy on her side.87 As the 
American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) noted in its amicus brief filed in 
Howell, “[t]he right to vote is a fundamental right afforded to all citizens.”88 
This right, the U.S. Supreme Court underscored in Reynolds v. Sims, “is the 
essence of a democratic society,” and its exercise is “preservative of other 
basic civil and political rights . . . .”89 In other words, the right to vote is the 
right from which all other rights of democratic citizenship stem.90 When citi-
zens lose this right, they lose their most powerful form of influence in a repre-
sentative republic: the ability to choose who will make the laws that “govern 
our daily lives.”91 Justice Powell appropriately recognized that Governor 
McAuliffe’s executive orders safeguard these rights.92 
According to the Sentencing Project, criminal disenfranchisement laws 
and policies affect more than 5,850,000 Americans nationwide, and hundreds 
of thousands of people in Virginia.93 In fact, Virginia has one of the most se-
vere felony disenfranchisement laws in the United States.94 In the vast majority 
of states—thirty-eight states and the District of Columbia—most felons’ voting 
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rights are automatically restored when they complete their sentence.95 In con-
trast, prior to Governor McAuliffe’s April 22nd order, Virginia was one of only 
four states that permanently removed voting rights for a single felony convic-
tion.96 Virginia is also a historical outlier; from 1997 until 2014, twenty-three 
states took steps to relax their disenfranchisement laws.97 In contrast, although 
numerous reforms have been proposed in Virginia, the Commonwealth has 
consistently failed to adopt them.98 
This failure to reform sharply highlights Virginia’s long history of racial 
discrimination and intentional suppression of minority voting rights.99 Virgin-
ia’s strict felony disenfranchisement laws have led to staggering racial dispari-
ties in political disenfranchisement.100 Before McAuliffe’s April 22 order, more 
than twenty percent of African-American Virginians of voting age were disen-
franchised.101 This number is staggeringly high: nationwide, 1.8 % of the non-
Black voting-age population and 7.7% of the Black voting-age population are 
disenfranchised.102 This disparity, argues the National Association for the Ad-
vancement of Colored People (NAACP), stems from the fact that Virginia’s 
criminal justice system disproportionally targets African-Americans.103 Due to 
factors like over-policing of African-American neighborhoods and racial bias, 
African-Americans are consistently arrested and prosecuted more frequently 
and sentenced more harshly than non-minorities.104 
Beyond its discriminatory racial impact, Virginia’s felony disenfran-
chisement policy also undermines the rehabilitative goal of the criminal justice 
system.105 Decreasing recidivism and crime via successful reintegration of fel-
ons back into society is a widely accepted objective of criminal justice reform-
ers.106 The initial phases of the reintegration process are vitally important to 
preventing recidivism.107 According to social science research, voting corre-
lates with decreased rates of arrest and incarceration.108 As the ACLU brief 
notes, former offenders “released in states that permanently disenfranchise at 
least some individuals with a felony conviction are ‘roughly ten percent more 
likely to reoffend than those released in states that restore the franchise post-
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release.’”109 Large-scale disenfranchisement also excludes large numbers of 
individuals from the community, creating entire classes of people who are 
forced to live on the edges of society; this hinders police efforts to build col-
laborative partnerships relations with the community and prevent crime.110 
In contrast to Justice Powell’s dissent, Chief Justice Lemons’ majority ar-
rives at an overly formalistic decision, substituting their interpretation of his-
torical context for the plain meaning of the text of article V, section 12 and ig-
noring the real, damaging policy effects of its ruling.111 Although the majority 
may find the past practices of Virginia Governors and General Assemblies per-
suasive, these past interpretations are not definitive.112 Indeed, as the majority 
concedes, “[past] observations do not preclude us from recognizing a novel 
executive power that no prior Governor ever believed existed.”113 The U.S. 
Supreme Court has laid the groundwork for this assertion, claiming, “[l]ong 
settled and established practice” has never been considered to be “binding on 
the judicial department.”114 The majority’s faithfulness to these past interpreta-
tions causes it to ignore the plain meaning of the language of article V, section 
12 and to substitute its own judgment for that of the clear written text.115 
CONCLUSION 
Governor McAuliffe’s Executive Order of April 22, 2016, was intended to 
restore the political rights of convicted felons who had served their sentences. 
In finding Governor McAuliffe’s actions unconstitutional the majority gave too 
much deference to the past practices and interpretations of previous governors 
of the commonwealth and failed to properly consider the broad effects of its 
ruling. Given the conflicted nature of the historical record and the clear and 
unambiguous nature of the language of the Virginia Constitution, Justice Pow-
ell was correct to weigh on the side of finding Governor McAuliffe’s actions 
constitutional. Giving controlling effect to the past interpretations of the stat-
utes in this case caused the majority to favor a convoluted interpretation of the 
statute rather than simply accepting its plain reading. 
Although no previous governor had sought to use his power in such a 
way, the Virginia Constitution gave Governor McAuliffe the ability to restore 
political rights to convicted felons en mass, to return to Virginia citizens their 
right to vote once they had served their sentence. By preventing such action, 
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the majority left hundreds of thousands of Virginia citizens disenfranchised 
and deprived of their most powerful tool to preserve their civil and political 
rights. Given Virginia’s long and troubled history with voter disenfranchise-
ment and the corrosive effects of felon disenfranchisement on the African-
American community, the decision leaves in place one of Virginia’s most 
shameful and counterproductive policies. Based on the plain reading of the 
Virginia Constitution and the laudable social goal of Governor McAuliffe, the 
Virginia Supreme Court was wrong to find his actions unconstitutional. 
